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PREFAOE
The purpose ot this thesis is to clarity the difference
between the divine attributes of omnipresence and immensity. TO
do so, the writer has integrated the notions of place and space,
as understood in a scholastic oosmology, with the above-mentione
attributes of God, and he has shown the attribute of Lmffiensity t
be the greater perfection.

An tmportant phase of this thesis is the olarification
of the traditionally scholastic notions of place and space for a
better understanding of the significance of the attributes of
omnipresenoe and tmffiensity. It is likewise vary important to have
stressed the teaohing of st. Thomas, as found partioularly in the

summa

Theologica, tor a more thorough understanding of Godts spe-

cial mode of presence.
The author has found it necessary to make many translations of his own from the Latin. Throughout the thesis, therefore, translations are his, unless the name of the translator is
given.
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CHAP'l'ER I
THE .4.PPROACH TO GOD

From the time of their tormulation. 80me eiSh\ oenturies ago, the five proofs 01' st. Thomas for the existenoe of
God have beoome olassio. The ultimate reason tor this is not to
be tound in the taot that Thomas Aquinas has formulated thafJ..
nor in any other of a host of extrinsic explanations. Rather do
these proots rest upon their intrinsic oharaoteristics and worth.
It is true that many other argufllents have been otfered to prove
the existenoe of God which are, in the opinion of many. as equally forceful as those proposed by Thomas. But nonetheless the
widespread aoolaim whioh has been afforded these proofs seems,
as it were, from their over-all metaphysioal nature.
Betore anything oan be said of God's essenoe or His
attributes, it is neoessary to indioate brietly the general pattern of the tive proofs for a better understanding of why God is
spoken of as the Immovable Mover, the unoaused cause, the Neoessary and supremely Perfeot Being, as well as the Infinite Ruler
of the universe. 1
1 A detailed analysis of these proofs may be found in
APpendix I of this work.
1

2

In all five of these arguments st. Thomas bases• his
conclusions on an empirioal fact which he introduces as the
major premiss of the argument. The principle of sUffioient reason, at times formulated as the prinoiple of causality or of finality, serves as the minor in an effort to aocount for the data
of experienoe. The oonclusion of each argument is a demand for
the existenoe of a Being Who has within Himself the sUffioient
reason for His own existenoe as well as the existenoe of the data
attested to by experienoe,
From the existenoe of motion in the world, st. Thomas
is able to prove the existenoe of an Immovable Mover to aocount
for that motion. Although he does not mention the fact in his
actual proof from motion, the oonoept ot an Immovable MOTer oontains the notion ot pure Aot. A mover may be referred to as aot,
because he acts only insotar as he is in aot; and an Immovable
Mover is nothing else but aot, because what is in potenoy is
movable as regards the act to whioh it is in potenoy. Therefore
an Immovable Mover is pure Aot. having no potenoy tor a further
aot. 2 st. Thomas reserves oonsiderations suoh as these tor his
2 See Qarolus Boyer, S. J. t cursus Philosophiae. Paris
1935, II, 310-311.
rtThe first Immovable Mover is Pure Aot, or God. This
part indeed needs only a briet deolaration. For a mover is aot,
sinoe he aots only insofar as he is in act; and an lmmovable
Mover is aot alone, sinoe what is in potenoy is movable toward
the aot to whioh it is in potency. Therefore an Immovable Mover
is pure Aot.«

3

•
aotual treatment of the essenoe and the attributes of GOd. Howe-

ver, it is profitable to note in passing the oontent of suoh notions as the Immovable Mover, for they give a basis and serve
as the foundation for the vast storehouse of a reasoned knowledge of God's 8s88noe. 3
In the seoond argument St. Thomas proceeds from the
existenoe of an order of effioi8nt oauses in the world to the
existenoe of an Uncaused Cause. This Uncaused. Unoonditioned, and
First Cause must be Its own action and Its own beins, since, as
Thomas himself remarks, operation follows being, and the mode of
operation the mode of being.' He further points out, when discussing the nature and the attributes of God, that this First
Cause is in reality selt-subsisting Being, completely independent
of all other beings. 5
In the third way st. Thomas argues from the existence
of a being which 1s possible to be or not to be to the existence

ot a necessary be1ng whose necessity 1s caused by no other--a

3 S •• John F. MoOormick, S. J., Natural Theol0§l.
Chicago, 1943, 95.
"Having built up our idea of God by a posteriori reasoning from the evidenoe which the human mind In the exeroise of
its natural powers is able to find in the universe around us. ,we
now prooeed to follow out what is implied in the idea so built
up."

4 S. T., It q. 25, a. 2, Basic writings of st. Thomas
Aquinas, ed. Anton C. pegis, New Yori, 1945, I, 241.
5

S. T •• I, q. 3, a. 4, Basic writings, ed. Pegis, I.

4

•
Being, therefore, Who has within Himself the sUffioient reason
for His own existenoe.
The fourth Thomistic argument for the existence of God
rests upon the grades of perfection which are round in the
world. It must be noticed, however, that not all perfections are
regarded in this argument, but only those which admit of degrees. 6 Suoh are the transoendental perfections of unity, truth,
goodness, and beauty. suoh also are accidental perfeotions, such
as heat, wisdom, and holiness. As regards substantial or essential perfections, some admit of degrees, as does life, but others
such as humanity do not. Here again the principle ot sufficient
reason demands the existenoe of the supremely £'ertect Being to
aooount for the varied degrees of perfection in the world.
In the major of the fitth argument, from the

gove~nance

of the world, recourse is had onoe again to a fact of experience.
It is evident that natural beings., lacking intelligence, do attain their ends oonstantly and designedly. TO explain this constantly recurring phenomenon. the principle of SUfficient reason
taking the form now of the prinoiple of finality is invoked. And
the conclusion that a Being Who is endowed with supreme lntelli6 Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, o. P •• The One God,
trans. Dom Bede Rose, O. S. B., st. Louis, 1943, 146.
~we are oonoerned with the absolute perfeotions of
being, truth, goodness, predioated of different things in varying degrees ••• "

5

gence must

~xist

is an obvious one.

There are, it is true, other arguments whioh have been
offered down the ages to prove the existence of God, some of
which are more readily lmderstood and perhaps more cogent in
their suasive power. Nevertheless, the widespread acclaim affor-

.

ded these proofs of Thomas is substantiated in the OVer-all metephysical mature of the proofs. Their force is undeniable. .i£i thar
the existence of God must be admitted, or the prinoiple of sufficient reason must be denied. 7

The reason for this is that 'fever

being whioh is contingent, changeable, composite, imperfeot, and
relati va is caused," and henoe a first and unchangeable
Who ts essentially and absolutely perfect, must exist. 8

~)eing,

Doubtin

or denying the principle of sufficient reason would involve the
doubting or denying of the principle of oontradiotion. since a
oontingent beipg, having no reuson for existence, could not be
distinguished from nothingness.
1R the Thomistic proofs for the existence of God, the

prime Mover, the First

Ca~se.

the Necessary Being, the Most per-

fect Being, and the Ruler of the universe is shown to be His own

•
7 Etienne Gilson J 'l'he Philosophy of st. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Edward Bullough, ed. Rev. G. A. Elrington, b. "P.,
cambridge, England, 1929, 94.
"At bottom ••• there is not one of the proofs that does
not demonstrate God to be the sole oonceivable oause of the sense
experience from which the proof has set out ••• ex nihilo, nihil
fit."
8

Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, 154.

action, and theretore His own existence. In Him alone are ess,.::nce and existence identified. 9 This is the golden key to the
whole treatise on the one God, and its "dominating principle."lO
In the proofs tor Godts existence it is necessary to
proceed by a posteriori argumentation, building up an idea of
God trom what the human reason is capable ot exhausting from the
ltmited, finite, and contingent world about it. It seeks to know
the cause of the wondrous effects it daily beholds. 'l'he proofs
thus tar have hinted to the inquiring searcher something of the
majesty of God. But he wishes to know more of the essence of that
supreme aeing, the First Mover, the Uncaused Cause, the Necessary
and Absolutely perfect .eing, the supreme Ordainer of all things.
The starting point of a study of the essence and the attributes
of God is had in the nature ot God as expressed in the proots for
His existence. ll A priori reasoning will oharacterize the turther inquiry into the nature of God.
Since the human reason cannot

ade~luately

encotnpass the

nature of God in anyone conoept, it must use terms atter a human pattern, distinguishing conceptually between the divine es-

9 The sum~a contra Gentiles of st. Thomas A~.inast
Lib. I, o. 21, literally translated by the Eiiglish Dominican fi'athers. London, 1924, 61.
10

Garrigou-Lagrange. The One God, 153.

11 Mooormick, Natural Theology. 95.

7

•

senoe and its attributes end between the divine attributes themselves, not, however, maintaining that suoh a distinotion is to
be found in the reality whioh is God. 12
When the human mind begins to delve into the problem
01' the nature of' God. it asks itself the (lUestion: What is God?

The answer oould be given either with regard to His physioal essenoe or His metaphysioal essenoe. This distinotion is made to
aooord with the notions of what God's essenoe is in Itself, and
what It is oonoeived of' by mankind, sinoe the human reason oannot know God as He is in Himself. 13 The physioal essenoe of
God, the reality which He is. can only be the "one absolutely
simple reality whioh is His fulness of Being."14 The human
reason oan, however. arrive at a knowledge of the metaphysioal
essence of God which ls. as it were, an

Instr~~ent

or means to

an understanding of the physioal essenoe of God. The metaphysical essenoe of God will be given in terms of that note which the
human reason oonoeives as the primary oonstituent of God as God;
likewise will it be that note whioh is oonoeived as the root and

12

Ibid.

13 contra Gentiles, Lib. It o. 14, trans. gnglish Dominioans, 33.
"In treating of the divine essenoe the prinoipal method to be tollowed is that of remotion; for the divine essenoe
by its UL~ensity surpasses every form to whioh our intelleot reaohes; and thus we oannot apprehend it by knowing what it is. But
we have some knowledge of 1t by knowing what it is not."
14 Mccormiok. Natural Theology, 99.

8

the souroe of all other perfeotions, and that note which·will
distinguish God from all other beings. 15
It is important to establish a oertain definite order
in treating the essenoe and the attributes of God. As was mentioned above, the metaphysioal essence of God will be a oertain
note whioh will serve as the root of all other perfeotions whioh
are found in God. It is necessary, therefore, to treat first of
that one note and then prooeed with the disoussion of God's attributes.
st. Thomas has suffioiently demonstrated that there
does exist a First cause. But the First Vause is a Being of Itself, a Being through Its very essenoe. or a Necessary Being.
This is evident, since

G

oause which depended upon another being

could not be first. To say. moreover, that something exists of
itself is to imply that it have within itself the suffioient reason for its existenoe, and hence that it exists by its own essence, and not by participation. Likewise, whatever is had essentially is had neoessarily, Just as man. if he exists, neoessarily
1s rational. Therefore God necessarily exists, or He is a Neoessary Being. l &
AS a consequent of God's being the Necessary Being, it
15 Boyer, aurslis philosophiae, II, 357.
16

Ibid., 358.

is olearly ev1dent that He is His very existenoe and that He i8
Infinitely Perfect. As a proof of the former assertion, it need
only be pointed out that only that very act of ex1stence is suoh
that it exists by its very nature; other things are, only insofar as they reoeive it. Wherefore. were God not Existenoe Itself,
He would be a caused and partioipated being. Therefore God is
EXistenoe Itself,l? whioh means that in Him essenoe and existence
are really identitied. 1S
From the faot that God is Existenoe Itself, it readily
tollows that He is Infinitely Perfeot, sinoe all perfeotions are
found in Him in the highest degree, as is made manifest from the
very nature of a being wh10h is gxistenoe Itself. A being enjoys
that pOBtion of perfeotion whioh" it reoeives from the aot of
existing. The essenoe of a being diotates that portion of the

80

of existenoe whioh that being is to reoeive. However that being
whioh is EXistenoe Itself i8 the unreoeived Pure Aot ofexiatenoe, and, as it is so, it oontains within Itself no prinoiple
of limitation whatsoever, and henoe enjoys the fullest perfeotio
of existenoe. The words of St. Thomas are outstanding in olarity:
"Thus God in His very existence has all perfections."19

17

Ibid.

18 st. Thomas Aquinas, De Rate et Essentia, Marietti
edition. Rome, 1948. 17-18.
19

Ibid., 18.

10
•
The question as to the metaphysioal esaenoe of God has

been raised. but apparently no deoision has been made as to what
would oonstitute that essenoe. Boyer studies the opinions which
were offered by the Nominalists, such as Oocam, by the scotists,
and by John of st. Thomaa. 20 occam. asserted that God's metaphy...
sical essence consisted in his actual infinity, or the surplus
01'

perfeotions which are God's. However the sum of all Godts per

fections oonstitutes His physical. rather than His metaphysical,
essence. The scotiets olaimed that His metaphysioal •• sence oonsists in His radical infinity, whioh is the need of extolling to
the infinite whatever is predicated of God. But first 01' all,
the reason tor suoh a predication must be found, and this reason
itself will be the metaphysical essence of God. John Of

st. Tho-

mes said that the metaphysical essenoe of God is round in His
lm:n.ateriality or intellectuality. notes which are actually the
source of other perfections. but it is

~ot

primarily conceived

nor primarily constitutive, since it is deduced from other notes,
and especially from the notion of Existenoe Itself.
For the above reasons. Boyer Oonoludes that the metaphysical essenoe of God is to be assigned to the fact that He is
Existence Itself. nor a being by His essence, or a neoessary

20 The opinions whioh are cited here are Boyer's interpretations. His critioisms of these opinions are to be found
in the same plaoe. Boyer, cursus Philosophiae. II. 360.

11
Being, all of whioh mutually imply one another; nor does Aseity
seem to mean anything different. n21

The. notion of Existence It-

self, however. is the primarily oonstitutive reason of God's essence. For the identity of God's essenoe with His existenoe is
the reason for His being a Being by His essenoe, a Necessary Being, and a Being dependent upon no other. Upon this notion, therefore, depend all other predioations which the human reason makes
of G04. 22
Sinoe the metaphysioal essenoe of God oonsists in the
faot that He is Existenoe Itself. the perfeotions whioh are predioated of God will have their foundation in this essenoe. st.
Thomas oonoeived an attribute to be anything whioh Oan be predioated of a subJeot. He oonsidered, therefore, Infinity to be
one of the attributes of ood. 23 However, in a much more restrioted sense, an attribute is understood as a perfeotion whioh is
oonoeived as flowing from an essenoe, and henoe the divine attributes will be oertain predioates, flowing from the divine essenoe. whioh are properly and oonversely referred to God. They
are not simple metaphors, but proper attributes. They oan only

21

Ibid.

22

Ibid.

23 MCCormiok, Natural Theoloer. 113.

12

be applied to God. 24
Before speaking of the various attributes of God, it
is necessary to keep in mind that these attributes are not really
distinct one from the other. If a real distinction is applied to
any nature, there must be a real composition in that nature.
Hence in God there oan be no a.ccidents. All perfections which are
found in Him must be really identified with His essence and with
one another.
From what has been said above, it is evident that God
enjoys the transcendental unity of being, since He is a being.
However, there is a further consideration to be made: scl., whether or not the divine nature can be multiplied, or whether many
Gods can exist. 25

Is God, of His very nature, one and unique?

From the fact that God is existence Itself, it is clear that He
cannot be in any genus, for He has no notes whioh could be
shered in or common to many.26

From the faot that God is Pure

Act. it tollows that He is not in any species as the result of
an individual differenoe, for individuation results from mutter
whioh cannot be found in a being who is pure Act. 27 God, there-

24

Boyer, Cursus Philosophiae, II, 376.

25

s.

26

Ibid., 89

27

Boyer, Cursus Phllosophiu6, II, 378.

.,.,1 •

,

I.

f'I

''i •

11, a. 3, Basic .iritings t ed. l'egis,

I. a8-90.

13

fore oannot be multiplied. If it be su)posed that two or •more infinite beings existGd, they would neoessarily differ as regards
some perfeotion, and henoe they would not all enjoy the same perfeotions, making them, therefore, less than infinite. 2S
God is, moreover, absolutely simple, having no oomposition whatsoever--whether it be substantial or aooidental, physioal or metaphysioal. Sinoe all oomposition implies potentiality,
there can be no oomposition in God Who is pure Act. 29 Quantitative parts suppose matter, whioh is a potent1al principle, and
includes the oapac1ty ot divisibility. Essential parts would be
matter and torm, matter being in potency to form, and eaoh in potenoy to the union. The composition ot essenoe and existenoe is
exoluded by the taot that God is Existenoe Itself. Moreover,
there are no aocidents in God, s1noe they suppose a potentiality
in the subject ot whioh they are aots. There is no oomposit1on ot
a nature and a supposite, since there are no aooidents in God,
nor an existence distinct from the essence. Henoe there is no
physical oomposition in God. That there is no metaphysical compo28 S. T., I, q. 11, a. 3, Basic Writings, ed. Fegis,
I, 89.
29
I, 25-36.

S. T. , I, q. 3, a. 1-6, Baslc writings, ed. pegls,

Boyer, cursus Phllosophiae, II, 376-379.
Garrigou-Lagrange, The one God, 171-204.
Mocormiok, Natural Tneologj. 119.
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sition in Him is evident from what has been said of the Unity of
God.
BY divine immutability is meant that God will always be

the same. 30

That He is immutable is evident from the fact that

He is Pure Aot. All ohange supposes some potenoy, sinoe what is
changed either reoeives an aot whioh it did not have or it loses
some perfeotion whioh it did have. In the first instanoe, it is
in potenay to the new aot, and in the seoond oase the aot whioh
it loses is reoeived in some reoeptive potenoy. Henoe it is evident that God Who is pure Aot oannot ohange. The same oonolusion
results from a oonsideration ot the Infinity of God as well as
from the notion ot His simplicity.
The divine attribute of eternity follows from the faot
that God is i~nutable.31

That whioh is-immutable oannot have any

real succession, sinoe this form ot 8eooe88ion, when internal, is
a real ohange. For this reason it oannot begin, nor can it end.
Henoe it is neoessary that God, being 1..in;nutable, be eternal. And
since God is EXistence Itself, He perfectly and simultaneously

30 S. T., I, q. 9, a. 1-2, Basio Writings, ed. Pegis,
It 70... 73.

Boyer, Cursus Philosophiee, II, 381-383.
Garrigou-Lagrange. 'tne One God, 268-275.
Mocormiok, Natural Theology, 120-122.
31

I, 74-84.

S. T., It q. 10, a. 1-6. Basio Writings, ed. Fegis,

Boyer. Cursu8 Philosophiae, II, 382-383.
Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God. 276-292.
Mccormick, Natural Theology, 122-123.

15
•
possesses His entire life, illustrating. as it were, the classic

detinition of eternity offered by Boethius: "the whole and perfect simUltaneous possession of interminable life."
What maybe spoken of as the fifth absolute attribute
01' God is His im;.ensity.32

This attribute refers to God's spe-

cial mode ot presence. In keeping with His divine nature and infinite pertections, His mode of presenoe will be different than
that enjoyed by a body, the human soul, or a pure spirit. Although His

i~~ensity

necessarily tollows trom the tact that He is

infinitely perfect, it is considered profitable to study that
speoial presence which God enjoys. The remainder Of this thesis
will concern itself precisely with that study.

32

Boyer, Cursus Philosophiee, II, 383-384.

•
CHAPTER II
STATE OF THE Q.U:!STION

with what has been said of the existenoe, the essence,
and a few of the absolute attributes of God, a sUfficient foundation is established for a presentation of the purpose of this
thesis. Only a brief mention of the immensity of God has thus
far ••en made, but the raaainder of this work will be ooncerned,
either direotly or indireotly, with it.
Although it is true that an exhaustive analysis of the
arguments for the existence ot 'Jod has not been offered. nor has
a thorough treatment been given to the essence of God, nor, in
deed, have all the absolute attributes of God been discussed,
enough has been said and suffioient proofs have been offered thus
tar for the oonolusions whioh have been proposed. There has been
no need to discuss the Divine Knowledge or the Will of God, tor,
although these attributes

a~e

themselves identioal with God's

essence. their consideration does not have an immediate bearing
upon this thesis. oocasion shall arise tor a discussion of a few
of the relative attributes ot God, but it shall be more profitable to reserve a oonsideration ot these until the sixth ohapter
of this work.

16
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AS has been said above, the immensity of God is• a

divine attribute which refers to God's special mode of presence.
It is a truism that His presence must be entirely different than
that enjoyed by beings endowed with bodies, by the human soul,
or by pure spirits, since His nature is essentially different
from all of these.

AS

an Intini te Bein,;' J His presence should be,

in a very real manner, endowed with oharacteristios of the Infinite. His presence, in a word, should be, and is, a most unique
one. As an Infinite Being He cannot be defined or limited to any
one place, as quantified and otherwise limi ted

~ein,:s

are;o And

although it can be most truly affirmed that God is everywhere,
oaution must be employed, so as not to limit His presenoe to a
oreated being, a finite world, a very much limited universe.
God is everywhere. He is truly omnipresent. 1 However,
He oan be said to be present only where His presence is aotual.
He can only be actually present where there is actual space and
actual place, namely in the world, in the created universe
whioh here and now exists. Although He is actually present to
all actual place and space which does exist in this created universe, His presence seems to be, as'it were. dependent upon the
existence of this universe. To say that God is everywhere is to
say that He is omnipresent, whioh is not an absolute attribute
attribute of God, but rather a re10tive one, insofar as it is de-

1
I, 63-6<d.

S. T., I. q. 8, a. 1-4, saaie writings, ed. pegis,
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pendent upon the aotual existence of the world. 2
There is, however, an absolute attribute of God whioh
refers to His speoial mode of presenoe in the world. It is oalled
divine immensity. As an absolute attribute, it does not depend
upon the existence of the world. In other words, God would still
be immense, even if the world never did exist.
It is the purpose ot this thesis to olarify the distinotion between these two attributes of God tor a better understap,d1ng of God's presenoe in thin,.ss. It will be neoessary to
"-

treat of the diffioult oosmologioal notions of space and plaoe
in detail, showine their divisions as well as the relation whioh
the various types of being have to them, there'IJy assisting to
olarity God's relation to them.
AS regards the method whioh is to be tollowed in this

paper. a tew things must be said. The tirst ohapter has laid the
foundation for a logioal disoussion of these attributes of God,
and this seoond ohapter has brought up the diffioulties whioh
are to be disoussed as well as a few of the more important aspects dt the problem at hand. In the following ohapters attention
shall be given. first of all, to a clarifioation of the terms of
plaae, spaoe, and presence. It shall also be neoessary to discuss
the distinotion between absolute and relative perfections, tor
this distinotion is to be applied to these two attributes.

2

Boyer, cursus Ph110soph1ae, II, 376.

L
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tailed oomparison of the two attributes will follow their individual oonsideration, as a prelude to the proof that God is immense
The fifth ohapter is ohiefly oonoerned with Godts existenoe in things patterned after the eighth question in the first
part of the Summa Theologica, but it shall also witness some explanations in the light of the remarks whioh have been made to
that point in the paper. There are also some further eonsiderations whioh will serve as corollaries of the fourth and fifth
chapters and which will also be a means of better explaining the
difference between the two attributes and the necessity of maintaining

~ensity

to be the greater perfection.

•
CHAPTER III
PLACE, SPACE, AND PRESENCE
The classio definition of plaoe l is the one given by
Aristotle in the fourth book of the Physios.! There he speaks ot
plaoe as the first, immovable term of a oontaining thing. An analysis of the terms in this definition will give meaning to it. 3
It is the term, or boundary, of a oontainer. The plaoe

1 John of st. Thomas begins his disoussion of plaoe b
dividing the generio notion of plaoe, sol. that whioh is aoquire
by looal motion, into extrinsio and intrinsio plaoe. "EXtrinsio
(place' is that body or surfaoe by whioh the placed thing is oircumsoribed and oontained. Intrinsio plaoe is that passive presenoe of a plaoed thing which is oalled ubi Cthe where2."
The writer of this thesis has CHOsen to oonsider the
extrinsic plaoe ot John of st. Thomas as place in the strict
sense, and to disouss intrinsic plaoe under the notion of presence. This is done to lessen the danger of oonfusion. rJohn of
st. Thomas, O. P •• cursus Philosophious Thomistious, ed. P. Beatus Reiser, O. S. B. t Talflnl, lQ35, 335.'
! Aristotle, Phlsios, Bk. 4, ohap. 6, trans. Thomas
London, 1806, 202.
"So that the tirst immovable boundary of that Whioh
oontains is plaoe."
This is a desoriptive definition, "for it desoribes in
what partioular manner plaoe is related to the body whioh is in
plaoe." tGerard Esser, S. V. D•• cosmologia, Teohny, 1939, 65.]

TaT~or,

a.

3 This explanation may be found in Cooter, A. C. t
J.), Cosmologia, Boston, 1931, 264.

see also Boyer, cursus Philosophias, It 395-396.
20
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of a body in place is the surface of another body by which it is
imnediately touched and surrounded, and in which it is contained.'

A man is said to be in a room when he is surrounded by

the four walls of that room. If a thing is not contained by another body, it is not in place, Just as the en'tire universe, taken
together, is not in place. since it has no container.
It is immovable; for a body in place does not ,change
its place unless the body itself be moved. If place itself were
movable, a change of place would occur without any motion of the
thing in place. 5

Boyer answers the difficulty presented in the

case of a ship anchored in the rapidly flowing waters of a river.
The place remains the surfaoe of the container, not materially
understood, but insofar as the container has a fixed relation to

4 John of st. Thomas, cursus Philosophicus, II, 337.
"Since a thin:: can be o!roumscrlbed only by reason of
a surrounding surfaoe. if indeed place must be adeq,uated to the
thing placed, and since we do not say that man exists in all the
air, but only in that part in which he is circumscribed, oonsequently plaoe must be constituted in the surrounding surface,
which is oontiguous to the body."
5 Ibid.
"It is oertain that plaoe must be absolutely immovable ••• because it is distinguished from a vessel in this that ••• a
vessel is moved with the thing contained, place however is not
moved. Plaoe, therefore, as the term both a quo and ad i.1Uem of
motion is not moved; otherwise if plaoe were moved, it would have
to move to some plaoe, and thus a plaoe of place would be had,
and again that other plaoe would have to be moved to another
place. and thus an infinite prooess would be had."
These words ot John of st. Thomas are clear enough in
explaining the ~obility ot plaoe.

22
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all the immovable points, which surround the ship. That surface
of water which is the place of the immovable ship on the river
is understood in accord with the relations of position and of
distance to the banks of the river and the river as a whole.
It is first, or

i~~ediate.

This is the meaning of

place in the strictest sense of the term and is had when the
surfaoe of a body

im~ediately

surrounds and contains one thing.

Place. on the other hand, is said to be common, when the surfaoe
of a body surrounds and contains many thlngs. 6
The oonsiderations which have just been made as regards
place are sufficient and complete enough for a proper understanding of the r-.lllltion which God has to place. However, it is rather important to say a tew words ot the objective validity ot
the ooncept of place. Experience manifests that some bodies,
such as air and water, touch and immediately surround other bodies. But place is nothing else but the surface of that body
which immediately surrounds and contains a thing. Therefore,
place does exist, and is as real as a body itselt. 7
Space can be defined as extension conceived as the receptacle ot a body. suoh a definition of space can certainly be

6 Dario, J. ;.{.. S. J.
paris, 1928, 137.
7

t

praelectiones cosmologiae»

cotter. oosmologia. 266.
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justified, even though it is not commonly offered. 8 Dario employs a somewhat similar definition when he says, "Space is extension, conceived as penetrable, or as capable of containing
extended things. n9 The formal conoept of space is not the same
as the formal concept of corporeal extension, for extension is
in bodies, whereas bodies are in space; extension is something
which is as movable as bodies, but space is something in whioh
bodies move. 10
As regards the validity of the concept of space,ll the

8 Ibid., 303.
" ••• it is a faot that almost one hundred different
opinions are offered on the nature of space ••• "
9 Dario, praeleotiones, 69.
10

Ibid.

11 cotter shows that space is neither a purely subjective phenomenon. nor a real being, but a being of reason with
a foundation in reality. His threefold proof follows:
"Space would be a purely subJeotive phenomenon, if not
even an objective foundation for our concept oould be assigned.
But suoh a foundation oan be assigned, sol. the extension of
aoAies. which 1s real. Therefore space cannot be called a purely
subjective phenomenon.
"Whatever is real either is a SUbstance or an aooident •
•• But space is neither a sUbstanoe nor an aocident. Therefore
space is not a real being ••• !f space were a substance, it would
be a.,body, for it is oonceived as formally extended. BUt wa conceive space as distinot from all bodies and as a receptacle of
bodies. Theretore spaoe is not a substanoe ••• If space were an
acoident it would have to inhere in some body. for it is oonceived as formally extended; this body, however, would again be
in another space--and thus infinitely. But an infinite process
is repugnant. Therefore space is not an aooident •••
"A being ot reason is a non-being conceived as a being.
But space in itself is nothing ••• it is nonetheless oonceived by

words ot Dario are quite clear:

24
•

Space as such, or formally, is

only a concept--frequently conjoined with a vague phantasm."l2
space does not enjoy a real existenoe, but it does have a toundation in the reality of extension. which in the opinion ot
Dario actually gives birth to the ooncept of space. He even desl3
oribes in detail the origin and the toundation of the conoept.
This generic notion ot apace is subject to a fourfold
14
division into actual, possible, tmaginary. and absolute space.
Aotual spaoe is had where there actually are bodies and three
dimensions. for although aotual space is not the actual oorporeal extension, it nonetheless tollows from it, sinoe it, as it
were. reoeives the dimensions of the1uantitied object. j.,otual
space. therefore, is the space which the book occupies on the
us as a real receptaole. Therefore space is a being of reason •••
The extension of bodies 1s something real. But the extension ot
bodies is the ontologioal foundation of our ooncept of space.
Therefore our oonoept has a foundation in reality." ccotter t
cosmologia, 309-3l0.J
12 Dario, praeleotiones, 70.
13 Ibid.
14 Absolute space is implied in imaginary space, but.
tor reasons of olarity, it reoeives a speoial division. This
will beoome more apparent further on in this thesis. 'I'his division is not to be understood 8S one which is commonly accepted
by scholastio oosmologists. Just as there are innumerable definitions oftered ot space, so there are countless divisions. ~t
would be futile to attempt their numeration. The division whioh
has been ottered 1s suttioient for the purpose of this thesis.
Boyer. cursus Philosophiae, I, 400.
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desk, or the box occupies in the store. Possible space is that
which is oonceived as arising froni the position of possible bodies; as for example, the space which Pope Pius, the fifteenth,
could oocupy in Rome. Imaginary space is that which is represented as existing without existing bodies, as would occur were
space imagined to exist before the actual existence of a sensible world, or beyond such a world. Absolute space is infinite extension conoeived as something existing independently of the
world and as containing the world.
One further oonsideratimn remains to be made

85

regards

the presence of a quantified being. a pure spirit. and an infinite being in place or in space.
Since place is defined as th6 surface of a body which
surrounds and contains a thing, it 1s evident that only bodies
are in place in a proper sense. for only bodies have surfaces.
Moreover, the surfaoe of a body is said to be extended, since it
consists of Various parts which both are in contact with the
parts ot the containing body and oocupy proportionate parts of
the space in Whioh it exists. Wherefore a body in place is unitea
by a quantitative contaot with the surfaoe of the surrounding
body, and it fills the parts of spaoe with its own parts. Therefore a oontaining body surrounds or airou,llscribes a body in plaoe
and it is measured by the place in Which it is. For this reason
bodies are saia to be in plaoe py a circumsoriptive presence.

26
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Bodies, therefore. are in place in suoh a way that their parts
occupy the various parts of a place. 15 Ciroumsoriptive presenoe
designates the presence of a body in plaos or in spaoe, and that
presenoe is by parts. This type of presenoe, moreover, is

limited~

since only one place is in oontact with the dimensions ot a thing
in place. In other words, if a body is oircumsoriptively present
in one place, it cannot at the same time be oiroumsoriptively
present in another place, not even by a divine intervention. 16
It is olear that a spirit, suoh as an angel or the
htman soul, cannot be in place or in space as a body is, since it
does not have extended parts. Nevertheless, spirits actually are
in plaoe. They oocuPY spaoe. The human soul, as an example, is in
the same plaoe as the body.1?

As regards the presenoe of an an-

gel, a pure spirit, in plaoe st. Thomas teaches that it oannot be
in a body or in a place exoept by its operation which wouldbrin.B
about some effect in the body.18 He becomes more specifio when

15 "That which by its very own dimensions is oommensurate with the dimensions of a place is in place circumsoriptivelJ
or essentially." tIbid., 406.J
16

Peter Hoenen, S. J •• Annotationes cosmologias, Rome,

1930. 114.

Here the author proves his thesis: "It seems that it is
absolutely repugnant for the same body to be oircumsoriptively
present in many places.~
l?

cotter, cosmologia, 268.

18 st. Thomas Aquinas, scriptum super Libros sententiarum, Lib. It dist. XXXVII, q. 3, a. 1, ed. R. P. Mandonnet, 0,
p., paris, 1929, 871.
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he says that as a body 1s in plaoe by the oontaot of qUantified
dimensions, so an angel is in plaoe by the oontact of its power. 19

Sinoe spir'its do not ha.ve extended parts but ex.ist rather

in their simple essenoe, they are present in their entire essenoe
in eaoh part of the plaoe whioh they oocupy. The entire spirit is
actually present in some plaoe and the entire spirit is entirely
present &n eaoh partioular part of that plaoe, Just as the human
soul is entirely present in the body and is entirely present in
eaoh individual part of the body.20 The claim is not made that
these spiritual beings are present in place by some quantified
contact, but rather that they exercise their aotivity in place
either as formal oauses, as the

h~~an

soul. or as efficient oau-

ses, suoh as the angels. '.rhis is the reason why at. Thomas maintains that they are present, not by a quantified oontaot, but
rather by the oontaot of their power, but nonetheless they are
still substantially present, since their power is but a manifestation of their presenoe; not the presenoe itself. Definitive
presenoe, therefore, desoribes the presenoe of the human soul and

ot a pure spirit in

19

pegis,

I~

~lace

or in space. It 1s a limited presenoe,

S. T., I, q. 8, a. 2, ad 1, Basio'#r1tings, ed.

65.

20 "That whioh is not oommensurate with the dimensions
of the plaoe in which it is, and is only in this determined plaoe
and not everywhere, is definitively in plaoe." (Boyer. Cursus
PhilosoEhiae~ I, 406.,

r
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since they oan be present in only one

deter~ined

place and not

everywhere. A human soul, for example, is present only within
the body of this particular person. This sume individual soul
cannot be in many men.
There is, however, a third type of presence which is
peculiar to God alone. Just as God Himself is an unquantified
Being, He cannot enjoy the sarne type of presence as a body does.
Nor can His presence be the same as that of the huian soul or of
a pure spirit, such as an angel, since their presence is limited.
His presence cannot be circumscribed, ,nor can it be defined to
anyone place.

AS

in the case of spirits, the reason for His

presencb is the power which He exercises upon His subjects. 21
It is sufficient merely to state this fact here, since a more
exhaustive treatment will be offered when, in the fifth chapter,
a discussion of the opinion of st. Thomas as regards God's special mode of presence is presented. Repletive presence, therefore, designates that special presence of God in place, a presence which is proper to Him alone. God is entirely present in
all space. just as He is entirely present in each particular part
of that spaae. 22 His presence is unlimited, just as His perfec-

21 S. T.
pegis, I, 65.

t

I, q. 8, a. 2, ad 1, Jnsic xritings, ed.

22 "God is eVerywhere eminently, neither circumscribed
nor defined." CBoyer, Cursus Philosophiee, It 406.)

•

tions are unlimited and infinite.
Although His presence can be truly said to be unlimited. since He actually is everywhere, it is likewise true that
the number of in4i vidual created plaoes, when added tOfJ;ether. are
still of a finite number. Although His presence is not limited
to anyone or the other of places, still He oan only be present
where there aotually are plaoes and spaoe whioh He oan ocouPY.
But these are of a finite number, and henoe it would seem that
His presenoe is limited. This difficulty is to be considered in
the chapter which immediately follows.

r
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GOOtS RELATION '10 PLACE AND SPACE
Although there are many different ways of olassifying
ahd distinguishing the divine attributes,l there is one special
division which can clearly embrace all the attributes. This division will serve as an invaluable aid in clarifying the distinction between the omnipresence and the

i.~ensity

of God. 2

EVery

attribute ot God is either an absolute or a relative one. It is
absolute when it can be predicated of God independently of the
existence of the world. This type of attribute refers to the Divine Substance in Itself, or to the Divine operation when it regards the Divine Nature alone, independently of a relation to
creatures. Thus, regardless of the existence of a created universe, God would still be one, simple,

~utable,

eternal, and

immense. He would still be endowed with an intellect and a will,
since their proper object is God Himself. An attribute is said
to be relative when it indicates some relation, though not a
real one, between creatures and the Godhead. It is an attribute

1

Garrigou-Lagrange, The one God, 164-170.

2 This division is the same as the one offered by
Boyer, cursus Philosophiae, II, 376.
3~
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which depends upon the actual existence of a oreated universe. In
other words those s»tributes are suid to be relative attributes
it they refer to Godts virtually transient operations, such as
His creation, conservation, and concurrenoe. The divine knowledge
and the divine will likewise can be oonsidered as relative perfeotions, when these two faoulties are conoerned with their secon
dary objeots. Every attribute, theretore, whioh of its very nature involves the existenoe of finite, oontingent, and created
being is a relative attribute.
Omnipresenoe is a divine attribute whereby God is aotually present in all actual space. This mode of presence is
different than that enjoyed by any tinite being, whether it be a
body, the human soul, or a pure spirit, tor God is in all things
as

aD

agent is present to that which it aots upon. st. Thomas

bases his proof for the omnipresenoe ot God upon the very taot
that God is EXistenoe Itself. 3 Since He is so, oreated existenoe
must be His proper effect. BUt

ae

oauses this effeot in creatures

not only as regards beginnings in existence, but as

lon~~

as they

are preserved in existenoe.' Hencs, as long as a thing has existenoet God must be present to it. And Just as He is the oause of

3 S. T., It q. 8, a. 1, Basic writings, ad. Fegis, I,
4 " ••• God oauses this effect in things not only when
they tirst begin to be. but as long as they are preserved in being ••• " C.Ibid .• l
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the existenoe and the oonservation in existenoe of all things,
H

must be in all thin;s, and henoe everywhere. 5
In the fifth ohapter of this thesis a more thorough
disoussion of the teaching ot st. Thomas will be offered. For th
present it is SUfficient merely to understand what is meant by
divine omnipresenoe. It is an attribute which regards God's aotual presence in aotually existing things. It implies nothing
more. sinoe He can only be aotually present where there is aotua
space.
Immensity, on the other hand, is a divine attribute
whereby God is actually present in all actual spaoe as soon as i
begins to exist. without any ohange ocourinf:j to Him. 6

There are

three elements in this definition of immensity which should be
explained. Existence in aotual space is a perfection, and henoe
God. as the Infinite Being, must possess it. Otherwise, He would
be limited and imperfeot. Moreover, He must be present in all ac
tual spaoe, for this is a greater perfection, and were He not to
possess it, He would be to that extent limited. It is evident
from His immutability that no change can be predicated ot Him.

5

Ibid.

6 " ••• The immensity of God is understood as a propert
by which God can in no place be either oiroumsoribed or defined,
so that no matter how often plaoes and spaoes are multiplied, not
only will God be in them, but He will remain oapable of being in
all others without end." tBoyer, cursus Philosophiae. II, 382.J
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It has already been said that the mode of presenoe
of

a finite being is measured by the space it oooupies or in whioh
it exercises its aotivities. Ciroumsoriptive presence and definitive presenoe are, in a word, limited perfections. Moreover, it
is evident that God is present in all things whioh are by virtue
ot His omnipresenoe. 7 However, His mode of presence must surpass
all space, so that His presenoe is not misunderstood as measured
or limited by the finite space in which that presenoe is. Immensity, as an absolute attribute ot God, is not dependent upon the
existenoe of 8 finite, oreated universe, and hence it does not
limit God's presence to that universe. Although God is aotually
present in all aotual space whioh does exist, He nonetheless
possesses, as it were, an overtlowing ot perfeotion which demands
that He be

actu~lly

present to all spaoe as soon as it beoomes

aotual, so that were He to oreate another universe, 8svast and
as oomplex as this one, His divine immensity would demand that
He be aotually present therein, possessins, however, the seltsame overflowing of Intinite Perteotion.
Independently ot the existenoe or the non-existenoe of
the oreated universe, God is

~ense.

Only on the oondition that

7 "God is ••• entirely in all plaoes, not by soraps and
fragments of His essence ••• there 1s no spaoe, not th
t
wherein God is not wholly aooording to His essen
,ateDl~
Charnock, Disoourses upon the~istenoe and th ~ ributesdt~~
God, London. 1842, 238.]
LOYDI ,~

~
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this universe does exist does God enjoy omnipres,enoe. Immensity,
therefore, is an absolute attribute of God. Omnipresence, on the
other hand, is a relative one.
The proof for the immensity of God depends upon the
fact that God is Infinite. 8 BUt repletive presence in space or
in place is an absolutely pure perfection, which positively excludes all imperfection. Therefore God 18 repletively present.
But repletive presence

~plies

immensity, and hence God is im-

mense. If the argument is to have any rorce, it must be shown
that replet1ve presence is an absolutely pure perfection and that
it implies immensity.
AS

regards the former assertion, it is readily admitted

that the presence of anything in space or in place is a perfeotion, since it 1s better to have than not to have. Raplstive
preseno., however, means that all the imperfeotions which are
implied in the presence of a creature are removed. These imper8 The exaot wording of the proof offered by Boyer is
the following:
-That which is so related to all places whatsoever
that it 1s neither ciroumsoribed nor defined by them is i~~ense.
But God in no way can be oiroumsoribed or defined. Therefore He
is immense. The minor is proved. What is oiroumscribed in place
has parts whioh are co~ensurate to the parts of the place. But
God is simple. Therefore He is not oiroumscribed in place. Finally. what is defined in plaoe does not have the power by whioh
it may at the same time oooupy another plaoe. But God is of infinite power. Therefore Be is not defined in any plaoe.~ tBoyer,
cursus Philosophiae, II. 383-384.)
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tections are twofold. In oircmnscriptive presence it consists
in the tact that a body is present quantitatively or by parts.
In both ciroumscriptive and detinitive presenoe it consists in
the tact that the presenoe is restricted to some determined
space. Repletive presence. theretore. is a perfection Which involves no imperteotion. Moreover. it positively excludes all impertection. It is therefore an absolutely pure perfection.
Divine immensity has been defined as that attribute
whereby God is actually present in all actual space, as soon as
it begins to exist, without any change oocuring to Him. If, however.,the divine nature were not to demand that He be immediately
present in all new aotual spaoe without any change, His presence
would not be repletive, since it would be in a very real manner
limited to the space in which He ls. Henoe repletive presence
~plies

immensity. And the conclusion that God is immense is a

valid one.

•
CHAPTER V

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS
ACCORDING TO ST. THOYtAS

From what has been said ot the omnipresence and the
immensity ot God to this point, it is olear that both ot these
attributes stem trom the tact that God is Existence Itselt, or
an Intinite Being. st. Thomas was so well aware of this fact that
imnlediately atter

~is

discussion of the Intinity ot God in the

Summa Theologica. he considers the existenoe ot God in thlngs. 1
It is profitable to study in de.ail the tour artioles whioh oomprise this question, tor Thomas considers the aotual presenoe ot
God in things as well as the mode of that presenoe. He oonsiders,
likewise the reasons why God is everywhere, and shows, finally,
that His mode ot presence is a most unique one.
In the first ot these artioles entitled, "Whether God
is in all things," the positive teaching ot st. Thomas is that
God is in all things in a most intimate manner, namely, as an
agent is present to that upon which it acts. Every aBent must be

1

S. T •• It q. 8, a. 1-4, Basic writings, ed. pegis.
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joined to that upon whioh it acts im.:l1ediately, either by • some
virtual oontaot or by quantitative contact. 2 An inoorporeal
agent cannot, however. exeroise any quantitative oontact. And
henoe the oontaot whioh God exeroises. as the oause of the produo
t10n and the conservation of all things in existenoe is a virtual
oontaot which cannot be re8l1y distinot from His essence. 3
st. Thomas thus shows that God i8 innermost in all
things sinoe He 1s the oause of their very existenoe. whioh is
more inherent 1n a thing than the very form of a ShinS, sinoe
existenoe is the ultimate aotuality of every torm.'

However, he

does not prove 1n this art1cle that God 1s the oonservative and
immediate oause or the existenoe of all things. Suoh a proof 1s
forthooming later on, when he writes, "AS the beooming or a thing
oannot oontinue when the aotion of the agent, whioh oauses the
beooming of the efrect, oeases,

i'

80

neither can the existenoe ot

2 commentary of cardinal Cajetan. O. Fe, S. T•• It

8. a. 1, Opera Omnia Thoma. Aquinatls. Leonine Edition, Rome,

888, IV, 85.
"Therefore He is in all things ••• beoause every agent
must be joined th that upon which it immediately aota."

3 "God is Existenoe Itself through His essenoe; therefore He has oreated existenoe for His proper erteot, not only in
beooming, but also in conservation." Clbid.l
4 "EXistence is formal with respeot to all thlnes
whioh exist in reality; therefore it is profoundlu in all things;
therefore it is intimate to eaoh thing. Therefpre God, the proper agent or existenoe, is intimately in all things."CIbid.l
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a thing oontinue after the action of the agent, whioh is the
oause of the effect, not only in beooming but also in existence,
has ceased. ft5

If, then, God is the proper oause of all created

being, then the being of things oannot continue in existenoe
without Godts preservative aotion. In the body of the artiole,
however, Thomas shows that oreated existenoe is the proper effeot
of God, Who is a Being by His very essenoe, just as to ignite is
the proper effeot of fire. Thus God both brings things into existenoe and preserves them in ex1stence.
The conolusion therefore whioh Thomas makes is that as
long as a thing has existenoe. God must be actually present to
it. and sinoe existenoe is the :.!lost ultimate aotua1i ty of every
form, God must be present in all things and innermostly.
It is perhaps in answer to the seoond objeotion that
st. Thomas gives a slightly different slant to what he has said
in the body of the artiole. The seoond objeotion maintained that
God rather oontains thin?s than is oontained by them. His response points out that oorporea1 things are said to be in the
thing whioh oontains them, but spiritual things rather contain
the things in whioh they are, as the soul oontains the body.
God. likewise, is in u11 things as containing them. not, however, as a form determining the matter, but rather as a causa
5 S. T. , It q. 104, a. 1, Basic Writings, ad. pegis,

J
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oonserving the effeot. 6

•

In the second article St. Thomas conoerns himself with
the question as to whether God is everywhere. The purpose of this
q~estion

is to determine whether God is in all things as well as

in all plaoes, insotar as they are plaoes. The diffioulty narrows
itself down to this: it seems as though God oannot be said to be
in plaoe, tor inoorporeal things are not in plaoe. st. Thomas
answers this objeotion ot Boethiu8 by asserting, as he did in the
first article, that inoorporeal things oan be said to be in plaoe
by their virtual oontact.
In the body ot the article a twofold answer is given by
Thomas. He is oareful to warn that God 1s not present in place as
oorporeal things fill a plaoe to the exolusion of other bodies.
He is in things as giving them their very existenoe. He is, moreover, in the real place itself, in the same manner as He is in
the thing plaoed, insofar as He gives existence even to the surfaoe of the surrounding body. Hence God is in all things and in
avery place. 8 He is, briefly. everywhere.
6 Garrigou-Lagrange, The one God, 257.
7 God is eVerywhere, because He 1s in all things, sustaining them in being; and because, while bodies fill space, God
too tills apace, sinoe He tills all the world." CA. G. Rebert,
studies in st. Thomas. London, 1938, 48.)

a

commentary of cajetan. S. T., I. q.
Edition, IV, 86.

a,

a. 3, Leonine
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In the third article, nWhether God is everywhere
essence, presence, and power," st. Thomas distinguishes between
God's speoial mode of presenoe in the just and His general mode
of presenoe in all things as an agent, or as an effioient oause.
He is espeoiAlly in the rational creatures who know and love Him
habitually, and most especially in the saints by graoe. 9 The ar
ticle likewise concerns itself with the threefold manner in whio
God, the efficient cause of all things, i. in all things. He is
there by His power, insofar as all things are subject to that
power. He is there by His presence, insofar as all things are
known to HLm and are the immediate obJeots ot His providence,
and He is there by His essence, insofar as He is the cause of
the existence of all things. 10
In the reply to the fourth article, "Whether to be
everywhere belongs to God alone," st. Thomas asserts that to be
everywhere primarily and essentially belongs to God alone, for
only God, atter creation. is necessarily and immediately in His
whole selt, undividedly, in all things and places, for He

main~

9 "God 1s in something in a twofold manner: sol. effectively and objeotively ••• the former is general, the latter,
speoial." tIbid., SS.l
10 "The general mode ••• is distinguished into existeno
in things by His essenoe, presence, and power." Ibid.
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tains all things in existenoe. What is primarily or imme~iately
everywhere must belong to a thing in its entire selt, and not
aooording to its parts. and henoe, although the whole world can
be said to be everywhere, it is not primarily or immediately
everywhere, but it is there acoording to its different parts.
Moreover. what is essentially or necessarily everywhere 1s so.
when, on any supposition, it must be everywhere. And hence, on
the supposition that no other body existed, a grain of sand
would be everywhere, not essentially or necessarily, but only
hypothetioally.1l

Therefore, "to be everywhere primarily and

essentially belongs to GOd, and is proper to Him; because whatever number of plaoes be supposed to exist. OOd must be in all
of them, not by a part of Him, but by His very self.,,12
In this article st. 'l'homas bases his ohief proof of
the faot that God is omnipresent upon the fact that God, the effioient cause of the beginning and the conservation in existence
of all places and things, is inherently present in things by a
virtual oontact. This contact 1s opposed to theoontaot of dimensive quantity by which bodies are in plaoe. The human soul
and pure spirits, as has been said above, oannot be in plaoe in

I, 69.

11

aarrigou-Lagrange. The One God, 262-263.

12

S. T., I, q.

a.

a. 4, Basio writings, ed. pegis,

42

the same manner as bodies are, since they are 1ncorporeat. Their
presence, just as the presence of God, must be descr1bed in term
of the power which they exercise in the plaoe in whioh they exis •
The human soul, therefore, has its presenoe restr1cted to the
body whioh it animates and vivifies. AS regards the presence of
a pure spirit,l! St. Thomas indioates the var10us p01nts of d1fferenoe between an angel's presenoe and the d1v1ne omnipresence:
angel's power and nature ar,.; fin1te, whereas the
d1v1ne power and essenoe, wh10h is the un1versal
oause ot all th1ngs, 1s 1nf1nite. Consequently
through H1s power God touohes all things, and Is not
present merely in some plaoes, but eVtJrywhere. Now
since the angel's power is finite, 1t does not extend to all things. but to one determined thing. For
whatever is oompared with one power must be compared
wi th it as one determined thing. Conse:1uently. since
all beine is compared as one thing to God's universal power, so one particular being is compared as
something one to the angelio power. Henoe, since the
angel is in a place by the applioation of his power
to the plaoe, it follOWS that he is not every~here,
nor in several plaoes, but in only one plaoe.~4
An

The oonsiderations whioh have been oftered in this
13 commentary ot cajetan, S. T. t I, q. 52, a. 2, Leonine Edition, V, 25-26.
"An angel is not everywhere, but in one particular
plaoe ••• He is not everYWhere, from the 4ifterence between the
power of an angel and the divine power: since the former is
finite, the latter infinite; the former is a particular cause,
the latter is the universal cause of all things ••• An angel can
have only one particular etfect; therefore he can be in only
one partioular place ••• And Just as universal being is related
to God's universal power, so some particular being i8 related
to the power of an angel."
14 S. ,T., 1, q. 52, a, 2, Basio Writings, ed. pegis,
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chapter are, at the very least, indicative of the fact that
Thomas ranked the omnipresence of God as one of His more important attributes. He does not formally discuss the immensity of
God, but nonetheless it is important to keep in mind the distinction which already has been made betWeen the two attributes. The
relative attribute of omnipresence is that attribute whereby God
is actually present in all actual space. The absolute attribute

ot

~~ensity

is that attribute whereby God is actually present

in all actual space. as soon as it begins' to exist, without any
change occuring to Him. Briefly, then, omnipresenoe refers to
God's actual presence in all things, and iUUlensity refers to His
aptitude to exist in them.

CHAPTER VI
SOME COROLLARIES
The

ola~s

which the divine attributes of omnipresence

and immensity make on God's speoial mode ot presenoe in the worl
are not to

be

oontused with the olaims of pantheism. It is hard-

ly neoessary to study here the oountless forma ot Pantheism whioh
have been introdueed down the ages to a truth-searohing people.

tor no matter how many torms are proposed, Pantheism always
stresses Godts immanenoe in the universe with an utter disregard
for His transoendenoe. l
Pantheism may be detined as any explanation ot the universe whioh, although admitiing the existenoe ot God. identifies
His reality with that ot the universe. 2

Suoh an identifioation

i8 made to explain the unity ot all reallty--a unity which is
preser.ed intaot without any separation from the souroe of that
unity. A Pantheistio philosophy seeks this unity in maintaining
that there is but one essence .or all things. It oompletely ig1 "In whatever way it is expressed, pantheism always
maintains that God is immanent in the universe but does not transoend it." CMcCormiok, Natural Theology, l85.J
2

Ibid.
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nores the contribution of st. Thomas whioh safeguards and defends the unity of the multiple by reason of the relation of the
multiple to the One Cause. 3
It is suffioiently olear that God is immanent in the
uni verse as the orL'lnating and conserving Cause of the universe.
sinoe there is no being in existence to whioh God is not intimately present. oontaoting it by His power and keeping it in
existenoe. The omnipresenoe and the im.."Uensity of God certainly
attest to this faot. But it is this very truth whioh is distorted by pantheism. 4 AS the Cause of the universe, God oannot be
identified with the universe. so that.

althou~h

He is im.:nanent

in the universe, His reality must be really distinct from it,
"sinoe God is neither the material oause nor the formal oause of
the world, nor its neoessary and effioient oause, but its absolutely transoendent and tree efficient oause."5

3

Ibid., 169.

4: some of the other truths whioh are distorted by Pantheism are the following: "There is nothing that is not, as to
the:whole ot its being, caused by God. There is nothing that is
not preserved by God, for the being of things is the proper effect of God ••• God operates in every agent. not to dispense the
oreature from aoting, as the ocoas10nalists think. but to apply
it to aotion. God moves the created intellect and immediately
moves the oreated will, but He does no violen•• to it ••• " CGarrigou-~~granget The One God, 203.)
£)

Ibid., 204.
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Therefore, although God is intimately present in all
things as the effioient cause of their beginning to exist and
of their conservation in existence, His reality is not identified with the reality which is theirs. It is hardly necessary.
nor is it oonsidered fitting, to delve into the countless arguments which have been offered against Pantheism. It is sutficien
merely to have indioated the 4ifterenoe between the olaims of
Godts speoial mode of presence and the olaims of pantheism. In a
word, then, Pantheism stresses God's immanenoe in reality, failing to oonsider His transoendenoe, whereas, Theism olearly main
talns His immanenoe as well a8 Hls transoendence.'
From what has already been sald of the presence of a
thing ln plaoe or in spaoe, it ls olear that nothing could be
actually present unless aotual spaoe exists. Aotual spaoe exists
only where there actually are bodies and three dimensions, sinoe
lt receives, as it were, the actual dimensions of the quantified
Object.?

An actually existing quantified object is said to be

ln actual space beoause its dimensions till the space in whioh
it is. Hence, if no actual space were to exist, it would tollow
that nothing could be aotually present, for just as the exis ...
6 "AS a oause ••• He has His reality distinct from the
reality of the universe. His rea.lity is immanent in the universe,
but also transoends it." [Mccormiok, Natural Theology, 186.'
7 see Chapter III
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tenoe ot aotual spaoe depends upon the existenoe of aotual and
quantified beings, so too does the aotual presenoe of an extended being depend upon the existenoe of aotual spaoe.
Do the same oonsiderations hold true for the presence
of an

un~uantitied

being in space? In other words. does the aotu

al presenoe of the human soul, a pure spirit, and God Himself
likewise depend upon the existenoe of aotual spaoe? It _7 be re
oalled that an inoorporeal being can be truly said to be in
space" not by any quantitative oontact, but rather by a virtual
contaot. insofar as that being exercises its power upon a corporeal obJect~8

It has likewise been pointed out that the power

whioh the human soul or a pure spirit exeroises upon a quantified objeot i8 a limited power. so that its presenoe at anyone
time is limited to one determined oorporeal objeot. Were aotual
spaoe, therefore, not to exist, a quantified obJeot could not be
aotually present, and neither the human soul nor a pure spirit
could enjoy aotual presenoe.
A

similar oonsideration holds true in the case of the

divine presenoe. His presenoe in a thing is, in a word, through
the power which He exeroises upon that thing, and sinoe His power is infinite, so too He must be in all things"as the oause
of their existenoe and their oonservation in existenoe. However.

8

pegis t I'tL 65.

S. 1' .. I, q. 8, a. 2. ad 1, Basio :.'ir1t~ngst ed.
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if actual s1>ace were not to exist, there would be no quantified
objects in which God could exercise His inrini te powl,;r. and so
He Himself could not enjoy actual presence without the actual
presence 01' -luanti1'ied objects in actual space.
Before the creation at the world only God existed.
There was nothing other than G9d in which He could exercise riis
infinite power.

AS

an Infinite Beins, furtherm.ost removed from

corporeity, He, the only exist1ng Being, possessed no actual presence. It is true that He was in Himself, but, having no other
being in which to exist, He was nowhere. Since actual presence
demands the existenoe of actual spaoe, and since the existence
of actual sp"aoe depends upon the existence of cluantified beine,
which did not exist before the oreation of the world, God was
nowhere. Betore the creation of the world, the world was poss'blJ
existent. The spaoe whioh it here and now does oocuPY. and whioh
now is actual space, ,was then only possible space. And although
it may be truly said that God was present in that possible space,
He was only potentially there, since actual presence can only be
had where there is actuel space. A being oan be said to be only
potentielly present, however, in potential space. God, therefore J potentially present in potential space 'Nhich was the world
before its creation, could not enjoy actual presenoe.
Now just as God was nowhere before the creation ot the
world. He did not then possess the attribute of omnipresence, fOI
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there was no plaoe tor Him to be. This is why divine omnipresence
is oalled a relative attribute. For. although the divine nature
de::nands thbt God be aotually present in all aotual spaoe. neVertheless suoh an attribute depends upon the actual existence at
the world. Even betore the oreation of the world, however, God
was truly immense. lie possessed then, as He does now, that aptitude, or capacity, of being aotually present 1n all actual spaoe.
as soon as it begins to exist, without any change ocouring to
Him. Independently of the existenoe or the non-existence of the
world, therefore. God is immense. This is the reason why immensitl
is referred to as an absolute attribute of God.
Absolute spaoe is defined as infinite extension conoeived as something existing independently of the world and as
oontaining the world. It is readily admitted that this notion ot
absolute spaoe is rather confusing. There is no reality, nor any
foundation in reality, for the notion of absilute spaoe. 9 Aotual
space, as was said above, oould not exist were there not extended
objeots, beoause aotual spaoe consists in the aotual dim.ensions

ot a quantified objeot. Independently of the world, there is no
suoh thing as aotual spaoe, for it is only in the oreated uni-

9 Aotually, as has been said in the third chapter, absolute spaoe is simply imaginary space, which "is a being of reason oonoeived after the manner of being, although it oannot exist~
[Boyer, cursus Philosophiae, I. 400.)
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verse that quantified being is found. Outside the universe.

fore. there is no aotual spaoe, nor any aotuallY extended objects
in whioh God exeroises His infinite power. If one were to maintain that God were 60tually present in absolute spaoe, he would
likewise have to maintain that God is aotually present nowhere,
for there is no possibility of actual ,resenoe where there is no
aotual spaoe.
Beyond the world, or beyond

t~e

oreated universe whioh
is the world, no aotual presenoe is possible. 10 For just as
there are no quantified objeots outside the world, so it is that
no aotual presenoe is possible. And since nothinG oan be actually
present where there is no aotual spuoe. so God, Who is nonetheless omnipresent and immense, oannot be actually present beyond
the world, where actual spaoe is not had.
10 Charnook shows, at length, that "God is present
beyond the world.~ His reason is that "if God were only confined
to the world, Be would be no more infinite in His essence than
the world is in quantity. As a non-Soholastio, his language will
have a shade of differenoe in meaning than the traditionally
soholastio notion of presenoe. Furthermore, he seems to be oarried away with the neoessity of stre8sin~ the fact that God's
presence is unlimited. CCharnook. Disoourses, 239.1

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
The threefold distinotion of the presenoe of a thing
in plaoe or in spaoe is readily seen to be a valid one, if the
various types of existing being be oonsidered. Ciroumsoriptive
presence indioat$s the presenoe of a body in spaoe or in plaoe.
Sinoe this presenoe is by quantitative parts, it is a limited
perfeotion, and henoe oannot be predioated ot the supremely Intinite Being. Definitive presenoe designates the presenoe of the
human soul or a pure spirit in plaoe or in spaoe. Although this
presence is not by q,uantitative parts, it nonetheless is a limited perfection, insofar as their presenoe, at anyone time, is
restricted to one in4i vidual body upon whioh they exeroise .their
power. They are entirely present in eaoh part of the body and entirely present in eaoh part ot that spaoe whioh the body oooupies. Their presenoe, likewise, is limited. Repletive presenoe,
on the other hand, oharaoterizes the existenoe of God in space or
in plaoe. It is a most unique presenoe, since the twofold limitation of oiroumsoriptive and definitive preLenoe is raInoved. God
is entirely present in all actual space, and He is entirely present in eaoh individual portion of all aotual spaoe.
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BUt even though this twofold limitation is not aharacteristic of God's actual presence, it nevertheless seems as
though there is a limit to Godts presence, since He oan only be
actually present where there is actual space, and actual space is
had only where there actually are bodies and three dimensions.
But only in this created, finite, and contin:;:en.t universe do 1:>0dies enjoy actual existence. Hence, it seems as though His actual
presence is limited, not by reason of Himself, but rather by reason ot the finiteness of the universe. This is the reason why a
distinction is made between the relative attribute of

omnipre~

sence and the absolute attribute ot immensity.
Repleti~e

presence not only removes the twotold limita-

tion 01' circumscriptive and definitive presence, but it likewise
jremoves the danr,er of the apparent limitation contained in the
Illotion of omnipresence, since repletive presence implies the absolute attribute of immensity. Not only is God everywhere, as His
omnipresenoe implies, but the repletive presence whioh He enjoys
positively exoludes all limitation and imperfeotion, whioh may be
suggested by His being omnipresent .. Were the Divine dubstance not
to demand that God be aotually present in all aotual spaoe, as
soon as that spaoe begins to exist, without any ohange whatsoever
ooouring in Him, the presenoe of the divinity would indeed be limited.
From the considerations which have been made in this
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thesis, one great oonolusion stands out. Although it is true
that

God is everywhere, His omnipresenoe is a relative attribute,
whioh depends upon the actual existenoe of the universe, whereas
His immensity, as an absolute attribute of the Godhead, does not
need the aotual existenoe of the universe to jUstify its predioation of the Godhead.

AS

such, immensity is the greater of the

two perfections.
In conolusion. it is oonsidered fitting to quote the

-

opening lines ot Robert Montgomery's olassic poem, entitled The
omnipresenoe of the Deity:l
Thou Unoreate, Unseen, and Undefined
source of all life, and fountain of the mind;
pervading spirit, Whom no eye can trace,
Felt through all time, and working in all apace,
Imagination cannot paint that spot
Around, above, beneath, where Thou art nott
1 Robert Montgomery, The omnipresenoe of the Deity,
London. 1841, 29.
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APPENDIX I
CONSIDERATIONS OF THE FIVg TH0:USTIC A.B.GUMENTS
FOR THE EIISTENCE OF GOD

The tirst argument whioh st. Thomas offers tor the exis~enoe

ot God is taken tram the oonoept of motion. His olassio argument may be s~~ed up in the following form. l Something in the
world is moved. But everything whioh is moved is moved by another.
rherefore that something in the world which is moved is moved by

another. But this mover either here and now is moved, or it is
!lot. If it is not moved. then an Immovable Mover is had, and the
thesis stands. It it is moved, the seoond mover, either here and
!lOW is moved, or it is not. If it is not moved, then an %mmovable
~over

is had and the thesis stands. It it is moved, the same con-

siderations must again be made. But it is impossible to pro.eed
nfinitely in such a series ot essentially subordinated movers. 2
~heretore

~J

there exists an Immovable Mover, Who is God.

1 For the exaot wording of all theae proofs, see s. T.,
q. 2, a. 3, Basic writings. edt pegis, I. 22-23.

2 ",ve are not oonoerned with past moyers 8.S in the
ot generations either of animals or of men; for these movers are accidentally and not essentially subordinated, ,and their
~nrluenoe has oeased.·' CGarrigou-Lagrange t The one God, l40.J
~eries
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• whioh
There are, however, two assertions in this proof

must be validated. First of all,,88 regards the first minor. 801.
that everything which is moved is moved by another, st. Thomas
ofters this proof. The same thing cannot at once be in potenoy
and act as regards the same perteotion. But what 1s moved is in
potency and what moves is in act. Therefore the same thing cannot
at the same time move and be moved as regards the same perfection. Therefore nothing can move itself.

~herefore

everything

Which is moved is moved by another.
There is a further assertion in the principal part of
this Thomistic proof which must be olarified, and that is that it
is impossible to proceed infinitely in a series of essentially
subordinated movers. In suoh a series of movers all the movers
would be instrumental. But if there were not a prinoipal mover,
the possibility of any instrumental mover would be taken away.
and as a oonsequent the possibility ot any motion would be destroyed. Therefore an intinite regress of essentiolly subordinated movers is impossible. st. Thomas is here oonoerned with essentially subordinated movers. He claims that it is not impossible for man to be generated to infinity, but in suoh a oase the
sufficient reason for the motion of each being could not be

toun~

within this infinite series. The suffioient reason tor their motion must be looked tor without the series of aooidentally subor-
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dinated movers. 3

The oonolusion of st. Thomas is that it is neoessary
to arrive ar a First Mover. set in motion by no other, and this
everyone understands to be God. The First Mover is immobile,
"not with the immobility of inertia or of passive potenoy, whioh
implies imperfeotion and is inferior to motion, but with the immobility of aotuality, who does not need to be premoved so as to
aot. ft4
An almost identioal prooedure as in the proof from motion is round in the seoond Thomistic argument tor Godts existence. In this

argu~ent

st. Thomas considers , the empirioal fact

that an order of effioient causes exists in the world. Two prinoiples are applied to this tact whioh lead to the conclusion of
the existenoe of a First Cause, Who is unoaused. and to Whom
everyone gives the name of God.
The first of these principles whioh st. Thomas introduoes in the minor of the argument is that nothing oan be the
oause ot itself. It a thing were the cause of itself, it would
be prior to itself, which is impossible. Such a proposition,
then, involves a contradiotion, sinoe the thing would be both
existing and non-existing at the same time, tor from the very
3 "If this series is eternal, it 1s an eternally insuffioient explanation of motion, and is not its own reason for
this." tIbid., l4l.~
4

Ibid.
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notion of oausality, a thing oan be oaused only insofar as it
does not exist, and it oan oause only insofar as it does exist. 5
The second prinoiple introduced by Thomas is that it
is impossible to proceed to infinity in efficient causes. It is
evident that st. Thomas speaks of the order of essentially subordinated oauses beoause of the very wording of this seoond prin.iple. Were he speaking of aooidentally subordinated oauses, his
assertion would be invalid.' As a proof ot this prinoiple, st.
5 There is a need for some explanation of the distino[tion whioh is made between the cause in fieri and the cause in
esse. For this explanation, the followIng citation is made: -"It might seem that from the existenoe of an etfect at
~he present time we cannot prove the present existence of its
~ause ••• This apparent difficulty will be solved if we take note
~t the differenoe between what is called a oause in fieri, that
lis, the oause of the thingts beooming, and the oause In esse,
Ithat is, the cause of the thingt8 being. Now the becomIng of a
~hing takes place onoe for all, and the cause of the thing'S bepoming must exist at the time of the thine's beooming, but need
~ot exist thereatter ••• The existence of an etfect in the present
~equires the present ex1stence ot its cause in esse ••• Now, it is
~he existence in the present of the universe as an effect ot
~od's power, and not the beginning of the universe, trom whioh we
~gue the present existence ot God as 1ts cause. H [Mocormick,
Natural Theology, 51.J
6 Boyer points out that, although a series ot aocidenSUbordinated oauses oould proceed to 1nfinity, within the
~eries there would be no sufficient reason for the saiies itself.
~here would be no series. without a First Cause. These remarks
~nderly Boyer's conclusion: "Wherefore even if the etern1ty ot
the world be supposed, the need of a First cause is not taken
away but rather increased. In acc1dentally subordinated causes,
there is not found an ultimate reason for the ettects; however
Ln essentially subordinated causes. it is impossible to prooeed
to the infinite." (Boyer, Cursus Philosophiee. II, 317.,
~ally
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Thomas

show~

that there must be a First Cause in such a series

of essentially subordinated causes, and it it be supposed that
there is not a First Cause, then no cause whatsoever could exeroise oausality, for, as in his proof from motion, the relation
of all instrumental oauses to the one prinoipal oause is evident.
If there be no first, or principal, oause, then the possibility
of the instrumentfs exercise of oausality is destroyed.
In the third way. the argument rrom oontingency, st.
rI'homas distinguishes between three different types of being. He
speaks of oontingent beings whioh are oapable of being or not
being. They are those beings which in their very nature have the
oapacity of not-being. of suooessively receiving various for4s.
~hey

are corporeal, corruptible, contingent beings, which are

oapable of beine or not-being. The seoond tupe of being which he
oonsiders may be referred to as neoessary beings whioh have and
reoeive their necess1 ty !ro;a another. 'rhey are necessary beinss
which have

D:

oause ot' their neoessity. They are those beings

which in themselves do not have a oapaoity of reoeiving various
forms successively, and whose essenoe is not composed of

ma~uer

and form. 'i'hey are pure forms, pure spirits, and henoe incorruptible beings. st. Thomas speaks of them as neoessary, but they
are necessary receiving their neoessity from another. The third
type of being which 3t. Thomas mentions in this proof is the absolutely and essentially neoessary being. It is that being whioh
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possesses most perfectly the reason why' it is impossible tor
it
not to exist, That reason is that its essence is its very existence.
There is a twofold structure to this argument. In the
tirst stage st. Thomas argues to the existence of n neoessary
being whose neoessity depends upon some cause. He shows that not
all things which exist can be oorruptible beings by the following
argument. There are things in the world which are possible to be
and not to be. Bat not all things which exist can be such, since
~hat

is possible to not be, at one time was not, for of itself

suoh a being is nothing, since it is of itself indifferent to
existenoe or non-existence. Wherefore if all beings were such, at
pne time nothing existed, and nothing would here and now exist.
~ut

things do here and now exist, manitesting that there must be

some necessary being whose necessity is derived, at least. from
some cause. This is all that Thomas, thus tar in the proof, insists upon.
It is the second stage of his

arg~~ent

whioh witnesses

his proof of the existonoe of an absolutely and essentially necessary being. st. Thomas has thus tar shown that not all beings are
merely possible, sinoe there must exist something Whose existenoe
is necessary_ ·He continues his argument in this tashion. A neoessary being either has its necessity caused by another, or it does
not. If it does not, then an absolutely and essentially necessary

62

being is had, and the thesis stands. If it has its necessity
caused by another, the same considerations must again be made.
~hen

st. Thomas. as he did in the first two arguments, intro-

duces the notion of an infinite regress, showing that an infinite
series of neoessary beings whose neoessity is oaused by another
is impossible. sinoe, as in effioient causes, if it were possible
to go on to infinity, there would be no First Oause, any prinoip1e cause, nor any intermediary oauses, so likewise here without
a first neoessary being, whose necessity is absolutely uncaused. 7
present-day scholastios do not propose the argument for
the existenoe of God from contingenoy in the exaot manner as st.
~homaSt

sinoe the Thomistic argument supposes the

4oo~r1n.

of the

composition of bodies. The scholastic argument is more easily
~nderstood

than 1s Thomas' argument. and it i5 hardly neCftssary

to summarize it here.-Their argument oonoerns itself with but
two different types ot being--oontingent and necessary. A contingent being is one which exists, but is likewise capable of not
existing; it exists. but not by virtue of its own essenoe. A necessary being is one whioh exists and is absolutely inoapableCot
not existing; it exists by virtue ot its own essence. with this
twofold division of being, there is no need for a distinotion
to be made between a being which is necessary, having a oause
7 Gar±igou-Lagrange. The One God, 144-145.
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of its neoessity, and a being whioh is absolutely and essentially
neoessary.6
The fourth Thomistioargument for the existenoe of God
is taken from the grades of perfeotion in the world. The major of
the argument merely states the empirioal faot that grades of per:fections do exist in the world. For the sake of simplioity, the
arguclent is conveniently limited to the transoendental perfections
whioh st. Thomas, principally if not exolusively, regards. His
~ords
~ood

are these, "There are found in things some more and less
and true and noble."
In the minor of the argument st. Thomas applies the

Wrinciple of suffioient reason to the empirioal faot enunoiated
in the major. A sufficient reason is sought to explain why per~eotions

oan exist aocording to a greater or less degree. _e-

oourse is had to the principle of exemplary oausality which st.
~homas

formulates in the following manner: "More and less are

~redicated

of different things insofar as they resemble in dif-

ferent ways something which is the greatest." It may rightly be
said that the reason why more and less ,re so predioated of dif·
ferent things is that they are so oonoeived, and they are so oonoeived, beoause it is neoessary to do so, since a diminished or
partioipated perfection does not have within itself a suffioient

a For a olear example of the present-day Scholastio
argument, see Boyer, cursus Philosophiae, II, 317-319.
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reason why it exists. It is not self-explanatory. Could

~t

ex-

plain itself, it would exist in the highest degree, for perfeotion of its very nature implies no limitation. Therefore if a
diminished or partioipated perfeotion does exist, there exists
also a being whioh has that perfection to the infinite degree,
of Whioh degree inferior things are but mere resemblanoes or
imltations. 9 Furthermore there exists a being whioh is the exem
plary oause of all things whioh have a perfection in a greater
or less degree. since an exemplary oause is that in whose imitation something exlsts. lO
The oonclusion of the first part of the argument is
that there exists a being which is the highest good, the highest
truth, and the highest beauty_ And since these notions are convertible with the notion ot being, sinoe they are properties of
being, there exists a being which is the highest being, a being
whose existence is infinite. And sinoe eXistenoe, as it were, is
the heart and oore of every perfection sinoe every perfeotion
1s only some mode of existenoe. it follows that his being is infinitely perfeot. ll

9

Boyer, Cursus Philosophiae, II, 326-327.

10 "Therefore it there exist essences whioh are greater or les8 degrees ot some perfeotion, it is neoessary that
there exists a higher degree of that same perfeotion, of whioh
degree inferior essenoes are but imitations." CIbid.'
11 "And sinoe these perteotions are convertible with
being, there exists a being whioh is the greatest. rt tIbid.J
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In the seoond part of this argument st. 'l'homas •shows
that this being is God Himself and is commonly acknowledge

by

~en

as the efficient oause of the world and of all the perfectiona
in thw world. 12 He appeals to the prinoiple that what is the

~aximum

in any genus is the oause of all things whioh are of that

genus. Therefore, what does not essentially possess perteotion.
but only by participation, must reoeive that perteotion tram some
effioient cause. And it this oause ita.lf does not essentially
~o8sess

perfeotion, a third oause must be analyzed. And sinoe an

. ~nfinlte regress of' efficient oauses is impossible, there exists
~n

effioient oause which essentially possesses perfeotion. But

~hat

essentially possesses perfection possesses it to the grea-

~est

degree. Therefore that highest being whioh is the exemplary

~ause

of all perfections whioh exist in a f·'reater or less degree,

onoe, is the effioient oause of the world, and at all the
~erteotions whioh are found in the world. 13
~t

The fifth way of st. Thomas is the argument from the
~overnanoe

of the world. In the major of this argument reoourse

12

G11son, Philosophy of st. Thomas Aquinas, 90
to the pi'ihotple ar causality
~t the end of the proot ••• its objeot ls by no meana to establish
~he existence of a supreme being; that oonolusion 1s already sepured. Its objeot is simply to lead Us to recognize in this
~1rst Being ••• the oause of all the perfections whio£"' appear 1n
.eoondary things."
"AS regards the appeal

13

Boyer, cursus Philosophiae, II, 328-329.

66

is had once again to an empirical tact. It 1s evident that natural beings. beings which lack intelligence, move toward an end,
and they do attain their end oonstantly and designedly. It should
be noted that st. Thomas is !lare excluding the case ot man. who
is a natural being though endowed with a certain amount. of intelligence which is not SUfficient, however, to direct all other beings to their end, as the argument implies. 14

But what is laokin~

in knowledge can act for an end only if it be directed by something or someone endowed with knowledge and intelligenoe. sinoe a
thing aots tor an end insofar as it is ordered to an eftect as to
its end. But such ordering supposes the abstract relation of the
means to the end be known

prio~

to the actual ordering, at least

to the ultimate oause of such ordering. Therefore the abstraot relation of the means to the end must first be known before the agent be ordered to the ultimate cause of the ordering. But only
an intelligent cause oan know this abstraot relation. Therefore,
what aots for an ultimate end is directed by someone endowed with

knowledge and intelligenoe. l5 st. Thomas oonoludes, then, that
some

ln~lligent

14

being exists who direots all natural things to

Ibid •• , 344.

15 "If the end is intended, and if the effeot 1s had
trom the intention and desire of the end. it is neoessary that
the end be known; for nothing moves if 1t be not known and willed
But to know and to will an end is proper only to a being endowed
with an intelleot." tIbid.)

..

their end. This men speak ot as God.
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AlthOugh st. Thomas does not bridge the gap between
his conclusion that some intelligent being exists who is responsible tor the order in the world and his ultimate assertion that
this being is God, it is nonetheless implied in the notion ot an
ordainer possessing the exemplary ideas ot the resultant order.l
Now the mind whenoe the order of the world proceeds either ot it
self possesses the exemplary ideas of that order, or receives
them trom another being. It it possesses them ot itself, it has
them to the highest degree and must needs be a being whioh is
superior to all other beings. In a word, that being must be God
Himself. It, however, it reoeives them from another, and sinoe
an infinite regress is impossible, there must exist some one intelleot whioh 1s the ultimate souroe of that order, namely, God
Himselt. l ?

16

Garrigou-Lagrange, The

17

Boyer, cursus Philosophiae, II, 348.

o~e

GOd, 152.
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